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Abstract. We present an approach for performing the tallying work in
the coercion-resistant JCJ voting protocol, introduced by Juels, Cata-
lano, and Jakobsson, in linear time using fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE). The suggested enhancement also paves the path towards making
JCJ quantum-resistant, while leaving the underlying structure of JCJ
intact. The pairwise comparison-based approach of JCJ using plaintext
equivalence tests leads to a quadratic blow-up in the number of votes,
which makes the tallying process rather impractical in realistic settings
with a large number of voters. We show how the removal of invalid votes
can be done in linear time via a solution based on recent advances in
various FHE primitives such as hashing, zero-knowledge proofs of cor-
rect decryption, verifiable shuffles and threshold FHE. We conclude by
touching upon some of the advantages and challenges of such an ap-
proach, followed by a discussion of further security and post-quantum
considerations.
1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, we have witnessed significant advances in crypto-
graphic voting protocols. Yet, despite all the progress, see e.g., [1], secure e-
voting is still faced with a plethora of challenges and open questions, which
largely arise as a result of the interplay between intricate properties such as vote
privacy, individual and universal verifiability, receipt-freeness, and a notoriously
difficult requirement, namely that of coercion-resistance. Coercion-resistance can
be viewed as a stronger form of privacy that should hold even against an adver-
sary who may instruct honest parties to carry out certain computations while
potentially even requiring that they reveal secrets in order to verify their be-
havior and ensure compliance. This property is typically enforced by providing
honest parties with a mechanism that allows them to either deceive the coercer
or to deny having performed a particular action. Due to limited space, we do not
elaborate on the long series of works in this area and instead refer the reader to
[21,12,22,11] and references therein for more details.
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Since the breakthrough work of Gentry [15] on fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE), there has been a surge of interest in this line of research that remains
very active to this day, with a series of recent advances including, but not lim-
ited to, a homomorphic evaluation of AES [16]. Although the use of additively or
multiplicatively homomorphic cryptosystems is common place in the e-voting lit-
erature, the relevance of FHE for potentially quantum-safe secure e-voting, with
better voter verifiability, was only recently discussed by Gjøsteen and Strand
[17]. In our work, instead of designing an FHE-based protocol from scratch, we
apply the machinery of FHE to a well-known, classical voting scheme, in order
to improve its time complexity and to replace its reliance on the hardness as-
sumption of solving the discrete logarithm problem with a quantum-resistant
solution, namely lattice-based cryptography. So far, no efficient quantum algo-
rithms capable of breaking lattice-based FHE schemes have been discovered.
Although constructions with varying degrees of coercion-resistance do exist,
the voting protocol introduced by Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson [21], often
referred to as the JCJ protocol, is among the most well-known solutions in the
context of coercion-resistant voting schemes. JCJ provides a reasonable level
of coercion-resistance using a voter credential faking mechanism, and it was ar-
guably the first proposal with a formal definition of coercion-resistance. However,
JCJ suffers from a complexity problem due to the weeding steps in its tallying
phase, which are required for eliminating invalid votes and duplicates. The ex-
haustive, comparison-based approach of JCJ using plaintext equivalence tests
(PET) [19] leads to a quadratic blow-up in the number of votes, which makes
the tallying process rather impractical in realistic settings with a large number
of voters or in the face of ballot-box stuffing. For instance, in the Civitas voting
system [10] based on JCJ, voters are grouped into blocks or virtual precincts to
reduce the tallying time.
Here we propose an enhancement of the JCJ protocol aimed at performing its
tallying work in linear time, based on an approach that incorporates primitives
from the realm of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), which also paves the
path towards making JCJ quantum-safe.
In Sect. 2, we describe the JCJ protocol and cover some related work. Next, in
Sect. 3, we show how the weeding of “bad” votes can be done in linear time, with
minimal change to JCJ, via an approach based on recent advances in various FHE
primitives such as hashing, zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs of correct decryption,
verifiable shuffles and threshold FHE. We also touch upon some of the advantages
and remaining challenges of such an approach in Sect. 3.2 and in Sect. 4, we
discuss further security and post-quantum considerations.
2 The JCJ Model and Voting Protocol in a Nutshell
Cryptographic Building Blocks. JCJ relies on a modified version of ElGa-
mal, a threshold public-key cryptosystem with re-encryption, secure under the
hardness assumption of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem in a mul-
tiplicative cyclic group G of order q. A ciphertext on messagem ∈ G has the form
2 This is a copy of the author preprint. The final authenticated version will appear in the
proceedings of Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2019, published by Springer.
Coercion-Resistant Voting in Linear Time via Fully Homomorphic Encryption
(α, β, γ) = (mhr, gr
1
, gr
2
) for r ∈U Zq, with (g1, g2, h) being the public key where
g1, g2, h ∈ G, and the secret key consists of x1, x2 ∈ Zq such that h = g
x1
1
gx2
2
.
The construction allows easy sharing of the secret key in a threshold way. The
weeding steps make use of a plaintext equivalence test (PET), which is carried
out by the secret key holders and takes as input two ciphertexts and outputs
1 if the underlying plaintexts are equal, and 0 otherwise. The PET produces
publicly verifiable evidence with negligible information leakage about plaintexts.
Finally, JCJ uses non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs and mix-nets,
which are aimed at randomly and secretly permuting and re-encrypting input
ciphertexts such that output ciphertexts cannot be traced back to their corre-
sponding ciphertexts. Throughout, it is assumed that the computations of the
talliers and registrars are done in a joint, distributed threshold manner. We use
∈U to denote an element that is sampled uniformly at random.
Agents. JCJ mainly consists of three sets of agents, described as follows.
1. Registrars: A set R = {R1, R2, . . . , RnR} of nR entities in charge of jointly
generating and distributing credentials to voters.
2. Talliers: A set T = {T1, T2, . . . , TnT } of authorities in charge of processing
ballots, jointly counting the votes and publishing the final tally.
3. Voters: A set of nV voters, V = {V1, V2, . . . , VnV }, participating in an elec-
tion, where each voter Vi is publicly identified by an index i.
Bulletin Board and Candidate Slate. A bulletin board, denoted by BB,
is an abstraction representing a publicly accessible, append-only, but otherwise
immutable board, meaning that participants can only add entries toBB without
overwriting or erasing existing items. A candidate slate, C, is an ordered set of
nC distinct identifiers {c1, c2, . . . , cnC} capturing voter choices. A tally is defined
under slate C, as a vector X = {x1, x2, . . . , xnC} of nC positive integers, where
each xj indicates the number of votes cast for choice cj .
Assumptions for Coercion-Resistance. No threshold set of agents in T
should be corrupted, otherwise privacy is lost. In the registration phase, it is
assumed that the distribution of voter credentials is done over an untappable
channel and that no registration transcripts can be obtained, assuming that
secure erasure is possible. Cast votes are transmitted via anonymous channels,
which is a basic requirement for ruling out forced-abstention attacks.
2.1 The JCJ Protocol
Setup and Registration. The key pairs (skR, pkR) and (skT , pkT ) are gen-
erated in a trustworthy manner, and the public keys, i.e., pkT and pkR, are
published with other public system parameters. The registrars R generate and
transmit to eligible voter Vi a random string σi ∈U G that serves as the creden-
tial of the voter. R adds an encryption of σi, Si = EpkT (σi), to the voter roll L,
which is maintained on the bulletin board BB and digitally signed by R.
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Voting. An integrity-protected candidate slate C containing the names and
unique identifiers in G for nC candidates, along with a unique, random elec-
tion identifier ǫ are published by the authorities. Voter Vi generates a bal-
lot in the form of a variant of ElGamal ciphertexts (E1, E2), for candidate
choice cj and voter credential σi, respectively, e.g., for a1, a2 ∈U Zq, we have
E1 = (g
a1
1
, ga1
2
, cjh
a1) and E2 = (g
a2
1
, ga2
2
, σih
a2). Vi computes NIZK proofs of
knowledge and correctness of σi and cj ∈ C, collectively denoted by Pf . These
ensure non-malleability of ballots, also across elections by including ǫ in the
hash of the Fiar-Shamir heuristic. Vi posts Bi = (E1, E2, Pf ) to BB via an
anonymous channel.
Tallying. In order to compute the tally, duplicate votes and those with invalid
credentials will have to be removed. The complexity problem crops up in steps
2 and 4 such that given n votes, the tallying work has a time complexity
of O(n2). To tally the ballots posted to BB, the authority T performs the
following steps: 1. T verifies all proofs on BB and discards any ballots with
invalid proofs. Let A1 and B1 denote the list of remaining E1 candidate choice
ciphertexts, and E2 credential ciphertexts, respectively. 2. T performs pairwise
PETs on all ciphertexts in B1 and removes duplicates according to some fixed
criterion such as the order of postings to BB. For every element removed from
B1, the corresponding element with the same index is also removed from A1,
resulting in the “weeded” vectorsB′
1
and A′
1
. 3. T applies a mix-net to A′
1
and
B′
1
using the same, secret permutation, resulting in the lists of ciphertexts A2
and B2. 4. T applies a mix-net to the encrypted list L of credentials from the
voter roll and then compares each ciphertext of B2 to the ciphertexts of L using
a PET. T keeps a vector A3 of all ciphertexts of A2 for which the corresponding
elements of B2 match an element of L, thus achieving the weeding of ballots
with invalid voter credentials. 5. T decrypts all ciphertexts in A3 and tallies
the final result.
Properties. Vote privacy is maintained as long as neither a threshold set of
talliers nor all the mixing servers are corrupted. A colluding majority of tal-
liers can obviously decrypt everything and colluding mixing authorities could
trace votes back to L. Regarding correctness, voters can refer to BB to verify
that their vote has been recorded as intended and that the tally is computed
correctly. Similar attacks become possible in case of collusion by a majority of
authorities. As for verifiability, anyone can refer to BB, Pf and L to verify
the correctness of the tally produced by T . The coercion-resistance provided
by JCJ essentially comes from keeping voter credentials hidden throughout the
election. A coerced voter can then choose a random fake credential σ′ to cast a
fake vote and present it as their real vote. Any vote cast with the fake credential
will not be counted, and the voter can anonymously cast their real vote using
their real credential.
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2.2 Related Work
We focus on the most closely-related works on improving the efficiency problem
of the tallying work in JCJ. Smith [25] and Weber et al. [30,29] follow a similar
approach in that they do away with comparisons using PETs, and instead, they
raise the credentials to a jointly T -shared secret value and store these blinded
terms in a hash table such that collisions can be found in linear time. The use of
a single exponent means that a coercer can test if the voter has provided them
with a fake or a real credential by submitting a ballot with the given credential
and another with the credential raised to a known random value. In [4,5], Araujo
et al. move away from comparing entries in L with terms in the cast ballots to
a setting in which duplicates are publicly identifiable and a majority of talliers
use their private keys to identify legitimate votes, and in [3] the authors use
algebraic MACs. Spycher et al. [26] use the same solution proposed by Smith and
Weber to remove duplicates and apply targeted PETs only to terms in L and A,
identified via additional information provided by voters linking their vote to the
right entry in L. In [18], publicly auditable conditional blind signatures are used
to achieve coercion-resistance in linear time using a FOO-like [14] architecture,
the downsides being the need for extra authorization requests for participation
privacy and a double use of anonymous channels.
3 JCJ in Linear Time via Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Our proposal revolves around replacing the original cryptosystem of JCJ with a
fully homomorphic one, thus allowing us to preserve the original design of JCJ.
The main idea is to homomorphically evaluate hashes of the underlying plaintext
of the FHE-encrypted voter credentials, perform FHE-decryption and post the
hash values of the credentials to the bulletin board BB. Now the elimination of
invalid and duplicate entries can be done in linear time by using a hash table.
FHE Primitives. Constrained by limited space, we only enumerate the cryp-
tographic primitives that will be required for the enhancement suggested below
and refer the reader to the cited sources for further details. Let Epk(m) denote
an FHE-encryption of a message m ∈ {0, 1}n under the public key pk. At its
core, for b0, b1 ∈ {0, 1}, given Epk(b0) and Epk(b1), FHE allows us to compute
Epk(b0⊕b1) and Epk(b0 ·b1) by working over ciphertexts alone, without having ac-
cess to the secret key, thus enabling the homomorphic evaluation of any boolean
circuit, i.e., computing Epk(f(m)) from Epk(m) for any computable function f .
We make use of FHE [15,7], fully homomorphic hashing [13], zero-knowledge
proofs of correct decryption for FHE ciphertexts [8], verifiable shuffles [27] and
threshold FHE [6], see Sect. 3.2 for more details on open questions and the
state-of-the-art.
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3.1 Enhancing JCJ with FHE and Weeding in Linear Time
We now describe how FHE primitives can be incorporated into JCJ while induc-
ing minimal change in the original protocol. We assume threshold FHE through-
out.
Setup and Registration. The setup and registration phases remain unchanged
w.r.t. JCJ, except that R now adds an FHE-encryption of σi, Si = EpkT (σi), to
the voter roll L. We adopt the same assumptions mentioned earlier in Sect. 2.
Voting. Instead of using ElGamal encryption, the credentials posted on theBB
are encrypted under some FHE scheme, say BGV [7], with a key pair (pk, sk).
Each voter Vi adds EpkT (σi), along with the required NIZK proofs, to BB.
Tallying. The tallying phase remains largely the same except that for removing
duplicates and invalid votes, we leverage our use of FHE to carry out simple
equality tests between hash digests of credentials. Since the concealed credentials
are now stored in FHE ciphertexts, we can process them using an FHE hashing
circuit. More precisely, for a jointly created T -shared key k, published under
encryption Epk(k), the credentials σi contained in the FHE-encrypted terms
Epk(σi) are homomorphically hashed (see [13] by Fiore, Gennaro and Pastro
and [9] by Catalano et al.), under key k resulting in Epk(hk(σi)), such that upon
decryption we obtain hk(σi). A ZK proof of correct decryption is also posted to
BB for verifiability, see [8] by Carr et al. for an approach to this. Once the hash
values of the credentials are posted on the BB, the weeding of duplicates can be
done in O(n) using a simple hash table look-up, i.e., iterate, hash and check for
collision in constant time, thus an overall linear-time complexity in the number
of votes. Next, the registered credentials and the submitted vote/credential pairs
are mixed [27] and the homomorphic hashing procedure is carried out again using
a new secret key on all credential ciphertexts. Comparing the hashed registered
credentials with those from the cast ballots allows us to remove invalid votes in
O(n). Finally, the remaining valid votes are verifiably decrypted.
3.2 Advantages, Potential Pitfalls and Open Questions
Apart from the linear-time weeding algorithm, as already pointed out by Gjøs-
teen and Strand in [17], in addition to being a novel application of FHE to
secure e-voting, obtaining better voter verifiability and a scheme believed to
be quantum-resistant are among the noteworthy benefits of such an approach.
Clearly, in terms of real world FHE implementations, the state-of-the-art still
suffers from efficiency issues. However, some significant progress has already been
made in this area, e.g., the homomorphic evaluation of AES [16] or block ciphers
designed for homomorphic evaluation [2]. Moreover, it should be pointed out
that some of the needed primitives, e.g., turning ZK proofs of correct decryption
for FHE [8,23] into NIZK proofs, are still not satisfactory and remain the subject
of ongoing research and future improvements.
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4 Further Security Remarks
A security analysis aimed at providing proofs of security for various properties
such as correctness, verifiability and coercion-resistance will remain future work.
One possibility would be to investigate whether the required security properties
in our enhanced variant of JCJ hold against classical adversaries, under the same
oracle access assumptions for mixing, PETs, threshold decryption and hashing.
Post-quantum security will have to be proved in the quantum random oracle
model.
Eligibility Verifiability. Assuming a majority of colluding authorities, apart
from a compromise of vote privacy, another, perhaps more damaging problem
with JCJ and its improved variants is that of eligibility verifiability. A colluding
majority would be able to retrieve voter credentials and submit valid votes for
non-participating voters, i.e., perform ballot stuffing. A solution in [24] suggests
performing the registration phase in such a way that only the voter would know
the discrete logarithm of their credential. Votes are then cast with an anonymous
signature in the form of a ZK proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of the
encrypted credential, thus preventing ballot stuffing. A similar approach could be
used here, with the potential downside of having inefficient proofs and a discrete
logarithm hardness assumption, thus not being quantum secure.
Post-Quantum Considerations. For a relaxation of the trustworthiness as-
sumption of R, without assuming secure erasure, quantum-resistant designated
verifier proofs [28,20] could replace the classical ones suggested in the original
JCJ [21]. To obtain post-quantum security for eligibility verifiability, future re-
search will investigate the use of a quantum-resistant signature scheme that can
be evaluated under FHE to preserve ballot anonymity. As a naive, but illustra-
tive example that is one-time only and non-distributive, consider that the voter
creates their credential as σi = h(x), and that only the voter knows the preim-
age x. The voter now submits both Epk(x) and Epk(σi) to BB. Before weeding,
the hash is homomorphically evaluated on the ciphertext of the preimage, i.e.,
Epk(h(x)), followed by an equality test against the ciphertext of the credential
Epk(σi). A malicious authority can now cast only a valid ballot with a registered
credential after the corresponding voter has cast a ballot, and an attempt to
vote on their behalf is detectable in the weeding phase.
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